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Abstract 
Flow is highly relevant and desirable in sport and exercise. Drawing on ideas from iconic 
philosophers of science – Thomas Kuhn, Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos – we argue that research in 
this field has followed a pattern of „normal science.‟ With a series of accumulating criticisms and 
„anomalies‟, we propose flow research is approaching a „crisis point‟. We highlight problems with 
research based on the traditional nine-dimensions conceptualization of flow. Then, drawing on the 
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work of Popper and Lakatos, we offer theoretical and methodological suggestions for developing a 
more progressive and practically useful theory for researchers and practitioners.  
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Flow is commonly defined as an intrinsically rewarding, harmonious psychological state 
involving intense focus and absorption in a specific activity, with a sense of everything coming 
together or clicking into place, even in challenging situations (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). Flow has 
been associated with exceptional performance (Jackson, Thomas, Marsh & Smethurst, 2001), as well 
as factors underlying long-term participation in sport and exercise, including: engagement (Hodge, 
Lonsdale & Jackson, 2009); enjoyment (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002); motivation (Valenzuela, Codina & 
Pestana, 2017); and wellbeing (Schüler, Brandstätter & Sheldon, 2013). Indeed, flow has increasing 
potential in exercise and physical activity promotion given the importance of positive experiences for 
long-term participation (Rhodes & Kates, 2015). As such, flow is highly relevant in sport and 
exercise
1
, and has been studied in this domain since the early 1990s (e.g., Jackson, 1992, Kimiecik & 
Stein, 1992). Since then, there have been a number of highly cited and influential studies (e.g., 
Jackson, 1995, 1996), validated questionnaires (e.g., Jackson & Eklund, 2002, 2004), a systematic 
review (Swann, Keegan, Piggott & Crust, 2012), book chapters (e.g., Jackson & Kimiecik, 2008), and 
books (Csikszentmihalyi, Latter & Weinkauff Duranso, 2017; Jackson & Csikzentmihalyi, 1999). 
Despite such progress, a number of criticisms and important questions have also been raised about 
Csikszentmihalyi‟s conceptualization of flow and the state of research on this concept (e.g., Voelkl & 
Ellis, 1998; Kowal & Fortier, 1999; Hoffman & Novak, 2009; Hassmén, Keegan & Piggott, 2016). 
Further, new and emerging insights stemming from recent research in sport and exercise (see Swann, 
Crust & Vella, 2017) have raised questions over fundamental assumptions about flow, and even the 
validity of widely used measures of flow (Jackman, Crust & Swann, 2017). In turn, there are issues in 
the application of flow, in terms of the extent to which athletes, coaches, and practitioners can draw 
upon the conceptualization of flow to reliably induce these experiences in training and competition.  
In light of recent critique (e.g., Hassmén et al., 2016), and suggestions that “research on flow 
states in sport is plagued by a variety of conceptual and methodological problems” (Moran & Toner, 
                                                          
1
 Other positive psychological states such as peak performance (e.g., Harmison, 2011) and peak experience (see 
Jackson & Kimiecik, 2008) have also been studied in sport and exercise; however, flow is the most developed 
(e.g., with validated questionnaires) and widely studied of these concepts, and therefore the focus of this article. 
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2017, p.193), it is timely to „pause and reflect‟ on the state of flow research in sport and exercise. In 
order to review and evaluate the state of research on flow, and outline a more progressive program of 
research and practice, we follow the example of Hassmén et al. (2016) in drawing on the socio-
historical and philosophical ideas of Thomas Kuhn, Karl Popper, and Imre Lakatos. Specifically, we 
identify problematic, or degenerative, trends in research on flow in sport and exercise; and offer 
theoretical and methodological suggestions for developing a more progressive and practically useful 
theory for researchers, coaches, practitioners, athletes, and exercisers. 
Paradigm Shifts and Scientific Revolutions 
 Defining „progress‟ in science depends on the philosophical lens through which you choose to 
look. Arguably the two most influential contrasting perspectives on this subject are those of Thomas 
Kuhn and Karl Popper (see Robergs, 2017 for an excellent critique in exercise physiology). Although 
they had different disciplinary interests and goals – Kuhn was a historian interested in what scientists 
do, whereas Popper was a philosopher trying to find logical rules for what they should do – both have 
had a significant impact on the way in which we understand the aims and practice of scientific 
research. 
Kuhn‟s (1996) highly influential work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, used examples 
from chemistry, physics and astronomy to describe how scientists typically proceed when conducting 
research. According to Kuhn, science is a social activity conducted in what he called „paradigms‟ 
(e.g., the values, theories, concepts, exemplars, methods, tools, language) which provide the “rules of 
the game” (Rowbottom, 2011), governing scientific behavior. Since scientists are socialized into 
paradigms, which are implicit and socially constructed, scientific activity in a paradigm is a rather 
dogmatic and prosaic affair. Indeed, Kuhn gave the label „normal science‟ to this unreflective puzzle-
solving activity wherein scientists busy themselves with the gradual extension and deepening of the 
paradigm. Nevertheless, as normal science proceeds, „anomalies‟ (i.e., results that do not fit with the 
predictions of the paradigm) begin to accumulate and, at some point, are considered to constitute a 
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„crisis‟ in the community, sparking a short but intense period of revolution (hence the title of the 
book). 
Science, for Kuhn, is therefore characterized by long periods of paradigm-extending normal 
science, punctuated by brief, rare (and seemingly irrational) revolutions in which the leaders of a 
community jump to a new paradigm, taking the rest of the community with them (Pires, 2013). 
Progress, in this view, has a twofold character. In normal science, progress is a function of the speed 
or rate of puzzle-solving, facilitated by deep agreement between peers and the development of new, 
more precise measurement tools (Kuhn, 1996). During revolutionary periods, however, where two or 
more paradigms come into conflict, progress is defined against criteria from within the paradigm, 
hence all discussions of progress descend into relativism (Fuller, 2006). In Kuhn‟s view, there are no 
supra-paradigmatic rules or principles one could use to assess the relative merits of one paradigm over 
another. 
Karl Popper, by contrast, developed a theory of the logic of scientific progress based on the 
dual convictions of realism and fallibilism. For Popper (1994), scientific theories aspire to truth 
(realism) and make testable predictions about the world (i.e., they are falsifiable). Testable theories 
also lend themselves to criticism, and theories that have undergone harsher tests (i.e., that are better 
„corroborated‟) are preferred as they are likely to be closer to the truth than untested theories. Science 
therefore proceeds in a continuous process of „conjecture and refutation‟ where bold theories are 
proposed and either overthrown in light of criticism, or maintained tentatively (fallibilism) until 
harsher tests can be developed (Magee, 1973). 
When confronted with Kuhn‟s ideas about science, Popper recoiled (Popper, 1970) and, 
whilst he reluctantly admitted that scientists may dogmatically defend their paradigms, he argued that 
such activity was „pseudoscientific‟ and would actively stifle progress (i.e., progress towards better, 
more truth-like, theories). Popper‟s normative theory of science – what he came to call „critical 
rationalism‟ – is often presented as a more rational and constructive alternative to Kuhn‟s relativist 
and conservative vision (Miller, 1994). Critical rationalism is presented both as an attitude, and a 
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method. As an institutional attitude it can be summed up in the phrase: “I may be wrong and you may 
be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth” (Popper, 1994, p. xii). As a method, it can 
be expressed as a four phase process: (i) define a problem situation; (ii) offer a tentative solution; (iii) 
submit the theory to criticism and eliminate errors; and (iv) define the new problem situation (Popper, 
1981). Progress, under a Popperian definition, is therefore characterized by an increase in empirical 
content of theories (i.e., they predict more novel facts, hence are testable) and the subsequent increase 
in the degree of corroboration of theories (i.e., we should prefer theories that have survived harsher 
tests; Popper, 1959). 
To summarize, we find Kuhn‟s ideas useful insofar as they help us identify „irrational‟ 
paradigmatic behavior on the part of researchers, and/or provide a critical sociological analysis of 
possible behavior (cf. Hassmén et al., 2016). Popper‟s critical rationalism then provides a normative 
framework that provides clear and unambiguous guidance on to achieve scientific progress. This 
literature therefore forms a basis for evaluating the state of research on flow in sport and exercise. 
Specifically, this article examines the state of the „paradigm‟ in flow research. First, we suggest that 
normal science has characterized much of the period since Csikszentmihalyi‟s initial „burst of 
scientific discovery‟ in conceptualizing flow by tracing the development of this concept within sport 
and exercise. Second, we examine a series of criticisms and/or „anomalies‟ which have been 
accumulating in flow research. Third, we argue that flow research in sport and exercise has reached, 
or is approaching, a moment of „crisis‟. Finally, we offer ideas to inform a shift towards new, 
emerging lines of thought, and draw on a Popperian notion of progress to explore opportunities for 
developing theories with greater predictive value and practical utility.   
Normal Science and the Flow Paradigm in Sport and Exercise 
Csikszentmihalyi's (1975, 2002) conceptualization of flow is purported to apply universally 
(i.e., in the same way across all domains and cultures). Indeed, it is claimed that “remarkable 
consistency has been found in the described flow experiences of individuals across diverse settings” 
(Jackson & Eklund, 2004, p.3) and that “the original account of flow has proven remarkably robust” 
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(Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002, p.90). In sport and exercise, flow is commonly understood in 
terms of nine dimensions (e.g., Jackson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1999). Three of these dimensions are 
proposed to be the conditions necessary for flow to occur (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002): (i) 
challenge-skill balance, in which individuals perceive a balance between the challenge of the situation 
and their skills; (ii) clear goals for the individual to strive towards; and (iii) unambiguous feedback 
that allows the person to know whether they are progressing towards their goals, or how to adjust in 
order to do so. The remaining six dimensions are suggested to describe the characteristics of the flow 
experience (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002): (iv) action-awareness merging (whereby deep 
involvement leads to automaticity and spontaneity); (v) concentration on the task at hand with no 
extraneous or distracting thoughts; (vi) sense of control over the performance or outcome of the 
activity; (vii) loss of self-consciousness (i.e., decreased awareness of the self and social evaluation); 
(viii) transformation of time (i.e., time becomes either speeds up, slows down, or becomes irrelevant); 
and (ix) autotelic experience
2
 (i.e., flow is described as rewarding and enjoyable).   
Jackson‟s (1992, 1995, 1996) original studies were the first to empirically examine how well 
Csikszentmihalyi‟s conceptualization applied to sport and exercise. For example, a classic study 
(Jackson, 1996, p.77) in this field employed interviews with elite athletes from a range of sports to 
examine “how do athletes' experiences of flow compare with the theoretical descriptions of flow put 
forward by Csikszentmihalyi (1990)?” Following inductive analysis to generate initial codes, Jackson 
employed a priori coding or “deductive analysis in order to examine the fit of Csikszentmihalyi‟s 
(1990) model of flow to the athletes‟ descriptions” (1996, p.79). This early study presented an in-
depth perspective of the correspondence between Csikszentmihalyi‟s dimensions and athletes‟ 
descriptions of their flow experience.  
                                                          
2
 In some instances – usually outside of sport and exercise – autotelic experience is not seen as a separate or 
additional dimension but rather a description of the flow experience generally (e.g., Engeser & Rheinberg, 
2008). In sport and exercise, however, the trend has been to present it as one of the nine dimensions (including 
in Csikszentmihalyi‟s work;  e.g., Csikszentmihalyi et al., 2017).  
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Importantly, that early work formed the basis of the subsequently developed Flow State Scale 
(Jackson & Marsh, 1996), later revised as the Flow State Scale-2 and Dispositional Flow Scale-2 
(Jackson & Eklund, 2002, 2004). Jackson and Eklund (2004) suggested that: “these scales were 
theoretically grounded in Csikszentmihalyi‟s (1990) nine dimensional conceptualizations of flow” 
(p.7); and that “items were developed from the nine dimensions of flow described by 
Csikszentmihalyi (1990)” (p.26); and “qualitative research examining the flow construct (e.g., 
Jackson, 1992, 1995, 1996) was drawn upon for the phrasing of items” (p.26). The resultant 
questionnaires have been used widely in sport (e.g., Koehn, Morris & Watt, 2013), exercise (e.g., 
Karageorghis, Jones & Stuart, 2008), and beyond (e.g., music; Wrigley & Emmerson, 2013), and have 
arguably become the primary means of assessing flow in sport and exercise. Therefore, most research 
in sport and exercise is based on Csikszentmihalyi‟s nine dimensions, through Jackson‟s early work 
(e.g., 1996) and subsequent development of the Flow Scales (e.g., Jackson & Eklund, 2004).  
Flow and Normal Science 
From a Kuhnian perspective it might be considered as a strength that the original conception 
of flow has been studied across many domains and with thousands of participants. Further, it could 
also be argued that „normal science‟ (Kuhn, 1996) has been established. In normal science, a core 
framework (e.g., a set of theories, exemplars, concepts and methodological tools) is implicitly 
accepted (but not questioned) by researchers within a paradigm, who engage in self-referential 
“puzzle-solving” activity (Kuhn, 1996). That is, normal science proceeds by extending knowledge of 
the paradigm (e.g., by observing and experimenting), in accordance with the accepted framework, 
without challenging or questioning the underlying assumptions of that framework (Kuhn, 1996). 
There is evidence of „normal science‟ in sport and exercise, for example, in qualitative studies that 
have often used a priori or deductive coding of data into the nine (pre-existing) flow dimensions (e.g., 
Sugiyama & Inomata, 2005; Bernier et al., 2009). This approach was used in Jackson‟s (1996) 
original qualitative exploration of the flow experience in athletes, whereby Csikszentmihalyi‟s 
dimensions were essentially accepted (a priori) as being true. Importantly, that data informed the 
development of the Flow Scale questionnaires (Jackson & Marsh, 1996) and their subsequent 
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revisions (Jackson & Eklund, 2002, 2004), which were also based explicitly on Csikszentmihalyi‟s 
nine dimensions. Given that the Flow Scales have ostensibly become the primary means of measuring 
flow in sport and exercise, this implicit acceptance of Csikszentmihalyi‟s dimensions means that little 
opportunity has existed for the conceptualization of flow to be anything other than „supported‟ or 
verified in this field. 
In turn, the “remarkable consistency” (Jackson & Eklund, 2004, p.3) and “remarkably robust” 
(Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002, p.90) account of flow identified by researchers is perhaps to be 
expected. While these early conceptualizations may have played a pivotal role in developing new 
ideas and directions for sport and exercise research in the early 1990s, continued use of this approach 
may now be inhibiting scientific progress (Popper, 1959). Current research in this vein may prevent 
the emergence of new ideas and insights by reinforcing the accepted flow paradigm without 
progressing or evolving our understanding of flow. Given the importance of this issue, we will revisit 
and elaborate on this point in the conclusion. 
Criticisms and ‘Anomalies’ in Flow Research 
The way in which criticisms are dealt with in scientific communities may tell us something 
about the state of the paradigm. Initially, during periods of normal science, criticisms are disregarded 
(e.g., as „anomalies‟) because they do not „fit‟ with the underlying theory (Kuhn, 1996; Pires, 2013). 
These criticisms and/or anomalies gradually accumulate until a „crisis point‟ is reached and they can 
no longer be ignored (Kuhn, 1996; Pires, 2013). This section outlines a series of criticisms and/or 
anomalies in the current flow conceptualization that we argue have largely been overlooked, ignored, 
or disregarded to date.  
How is Flow Experienced?  
Csikszentmihalyi‟s initial conceptualization of flow (1975) was informed by 
phenomenological epistemology, which emphasized description of participants‟ experience (see 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, pp. xiii-xvii). As a result, the initial conceptualization focused largely on 
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description rather than theorizing and explanation and, indeed, Csikszentmihalyi (1992) later 
discussed hesitation about developing a „mechanistic‟ explanation of flow:  
I guess I have always worried about “breaking the spirit” of flow by defining it too soon and 
too precisely. At the same time, I‟ve often wondered whether this reluctance to operationalize 
was not a form of cowardice, a way to avoid exposing the theory to testing and to potential 
falsification (p.183).  
While the resulting descriptive conceptualization of flow has been studied extensively across many 
areas of research, it has also received criticism. For example, Hoffman and Novak (2009, p.26) argued 
that: “It is an understatement to suggest that there is some lack of consistency in operational 
definitions of flow used by different researchers,” while Kowal and Fortier (1999) have also critiqued 
the “ambiguity concerning individual characteristics of flow” (p.365). The following sections outline 
a number of issues in the conceptualization of flow in sport and exercise.  
Imprecise definition of flow dimensions. Under critical examination, some terminology 
used within Csikszentmihalyi‟s flow conceptualization is imprecise and open to interpretation (cf. 
Swann, Crust, Keegan, Piggott & Hemmings, 2015). As one example, the type of goal necessary in 
the clear goals dimension is unclear. There are many different types of goals (e.g., process, 
performance, outcome – Hardy, Jones & Gould, 1996; specific, „do your best‟ – Locke & Latham, 
2013; emergent goals – Csikszentmihalyi, 1978) but it is not stated whether these are all relevant for 
flow, and if so, whether they are all equally relevant. An experimental study (Schweickle, Groves, 
Vella, & Swann, 2017) found that goal types significantly influenced subjective experience (i.e., flow 
and clutch states, as discussed below) during a cognitive task, suggesting that clarification of the goal 
types necessary for flow is highly important. It may previously have been the case that flow 
dimensions were defined broadly to maintain relevance across a broad number of domains (e.g., the 
various activities included in Csikszentmihalyi‟s initial study in 1975). The broad, and arguably 
imprecise, definition of these dimensions in sport and exercise is, however, problematic for 
researchers, practitioners, and athletes/exercisers wishing to apply them. For example, broad 
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definitions are more difficult to test or attempt to falsify; more easily allow for the suggestion that 
flow is experienced in the same way „universally‟ (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002); and may ultimately lead 
to imprecise understanding of flow (e.g., by encompassing almost any aspect of positive experiences).  
Overlapping and missing constructs. There is also lack of clarity surrounding the 
conceptualization of flow in terms of coherence with other constructs in sport and exercise 
psychology. For example, Jackson and Csikszentmihalyi‟s (1999) book, based largely on Jackson‟s 
(1992, 1995, 1996) earlier empirical work, refers to confidence under three different dimensions: 
challenge-skill balance, clear goals, and sense of control. This issue poses problematic overlaps, for 
example, when qualitative researchers seek to code data on confidence during flow. Other overlaps 
are also apparent in flow dimensions. For example, loss of self-consciousness, action-awareness 
merging, and concentration on the task at hand have all been characterized in terms of feeling „at one‟ 
with the activity (Jackson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1999). Furthermore, the absence of critical, 
extraneous, and/or negative thoughts is referred to in concentration on the task at hand, loss of self-
consciousness, and sense of control (Jackson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1999). In addition to extensive 
overlaps within the conceptualization of flow, core constructs are often reported during flow (e.g., 
arousal, motivation, confidence) which are not explicitly outlined within the nine dimensions (Swann 
et al., 2012). Finally, Csikszentmihalyi‟s (1975, 2002) work refers to perceptions relating to the body, 
and some athletes have reported “bodily sensations” (e.g., Chavez, 2008; Jackman, Fitzpatrick, Lane & 
Swann, 2017) during flow. This component is not currently represented in the nine-dimensions 
conceptualization, and may be specific to sport and exercise (e.g., compared to writing, which does not 
require vigorous use of the body). As such, the nine-dimensions framework: (i) is missing core aspects 
of the flow experience, and (ii) includes overlaps in its conceptualization of other experiential 
characteristics. Together, these issues could be leading to incomplete and/or ambiguous description 
and understanding of the experience of flow. 
 Low support for certain dimensions. Another issue in flow research is that certain 
dimensions have received low empirical support compared to others. For example, in a systematic 
review of flow in elite sport, Swann et al. (2012) reported that less than 30% of athletes in the 
 
 
 
 
SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND FLOW  11 
included qualitative studies reported the dimensions loss of self-consciousness and transformation of 
time. In early work in this field, Jackson (1992) found that loss of self-consciousness was not strongly 
endorsed by a majority of figure skaters in her sample. She suggested they may have misunderstood 
the concept, and that low support for this dimension “perhaps reflected the ambiguity surrounding 
what self-consciousness entails” (1992, p.170). In later work, for example in the validation of the 
Flow State Scale-2, the dimension time transformation exhibited only modest relationships with the 
other subscales (see Jackson & Eklund, 2004, pp. 48-51). The low support found for these dimensions 
in sport and exercise is typically overlooked. For example, subscales for all nine dimensions are 
included when the FSS-2 is used in quantitative studies. This issue raises fundamental questions over 
the flow framework, such as: whether flow should continue to be conceptualized as nine dimensions; 
whether dimensions with low support require revision; and how data based on the flow framework 
(e.g., the Flow Scale questionnaires) should be interpreted (see following section).   
How many dimensions are necessary to constitute a flow experience? Hassmén et al 
(2016) have highlighted that “there is not even agreement about how many of the „dimensions‟ need 
to be present before a flow state can be classified” (p.8). For example, there are suggestions that 
“experiencing flow means that all components…have to be present” (Engeser, 2012, p.25); and, 
alternatively, that “some components…are not always part of flow experiences” (Schiefele, 2013, 
p.529). Empirically, 93% of Jackson‟s (1996) sample reported themes which fit into five or more of 
the nine flow dimensions; while Sugiyama and Inomata (2005) reported that an average of 5.8 of the 
nine dimensions applied to their athletes‟ experiences. Thus, it remains unclear as to how many 
dimensions need to be reported/experienced before flow can be considered to have occurred. This 
issue is complicated further by suggestions that flow can range from micro (low-intensity) to macro 
(deep) flow states (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1992).  
Summary. Collectively, these critiques suggest that: (i) the flow framework is based on 
broad, overlapping, and imprecisely defined dimensions with varying levels of support; and (ii) there 
is a lack of consensus regarding the number and/or combination of dimensions required to classify a 
flow state. These problems mean that Csikszentmihalyi‟s conceptualization of what individuals 
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experience during flow is somewhat unclear.  Furthermore, such issues are often overlooked (e.g., in 
questionnaires that continue to measure dimensions with low support), which indicates that normal 
science has been established. Through the following sections, we argue that these issues are 
accumulating and that flow research in sport and exercise is reaching a „crisis point‟ (Kuhn, 1996).  
How and When Does Flow Occur? 
There has been extensive research in sport and exercise on the occurrence of flow, 
particularly from a qualitative perspective (e.g., Jackson, 1995). A systematic review of flow in elite 
sport (Swann et al., 2012) highlighted 12 facilitators of flow, such as: effective preparation; positive 
thoughts and emotions; optimal environmental and situational conditions; positive feedback; and 
optimal motivation and arousal. While these factors may facilitate flow, it remains that these are 
simply associations rather than causal mechanisms (Mackie, 1980; Swann, Piggott, Crust, Keegan, & 
Hemmings, 2015). For example, effective preparation is simply associated with flow occurrence, but 
not necessarily involved as a causal mechanism, as flow may still occur in its absence (Swann et al., 
2012). In addition to qualitative work, extensive research on flow using questionnaire-based, 
correlational designs has further highlighted associations with flow (e.g., goal orientations – Stavrou 
et al., 2015). Thus, research on flow occurrence to date is primarily based on evidence of constructs 
associated with flow, rather than causal mechanisms, resulting in recent calls for the need to build 
towards a causal explanation of flow (Kimiecik & Stein, 1992; Swann, Crust, & Vella, 2017). 
Furthermore, much of this evidence stems from use of questionnaires based explicitly on 
Csikszentmihalyi‟s nine dimensions, which poses the issues discussed above. 
As noted above, the common conceptualization of flow outlines nine dimensions: six of 
which are simply proposed to describe characteristics of the experience, with the remaining three 
dimensions (challenge-skill balance, clear goals, unambiguous feedback) proposed to be conditions of 
flow (e.g., Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). While these necessary conditions are proposed, 
together they are not sufficient for flow to occur – as evidenced by the issue that flow experiences 
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remain rare and elusive despite over 40 years of research. Indeed, this issue was highlighted recently 
by Csikszentmihalyi et al. (2017):  
[N]o magic formula exists for creating flow. You cannot conjure it up by following a 
recipe or rigidly adhering to a series of steps. Although certain conditions must be 
 present for flow to occur, their presence does not guarantee that flow will occur (p.vi).  
As such, the sufficient conditions of flow remain unknown, and this fundamental issue raises 
questions as to whether current understanding of flow represents a theory.  
Is the Conceptualization of Flow a Theory?  
A range of terms have been used in relation to flow. For example, Csikszentmihalyi (1975) 
originally described flow as a “theoretical model of enjoyment” (pp.35-54), and discussed the “model 
of flow” (p.49), while later referring to “flow theory” (e.g., Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2009). In 
sport and exercise, researchers refer to the “flow model” (e.g., Koehn et al, 2013) and “flow theory” 
(e.g., Stavrou et al., 2015). Generally, challenge-skill balance has been considered the primary 
condition for flow occurrence (see Fong, Zaleski & Leach, 2015), and a number of models based on 
challenge-skill balance have emerged and evolved since Csikszentmihalyi‟s (1975) initial work. 
Models are descriptive in nature, typically involving a deliberate simplification of a phenomenon or a 
specific aspect of a phenomenon, and stating relationships among constructs (Moneta, 2012; Nilsen, 
2015). These flow models generally postulate how combinations of high and low challenge and skill 
can lead to outcomes such as boredom, anxiety, and flow (see Moneta, 2012 for a review). While 
there is support for challenge-skill balance as an important factor in flow (Fong et al., 2015), alone it 
is insufficient for these states to occur (as discussed above).  
What is a good theory? Although description is an essential first step (Pentland, 1999), 
explanation is considered to be the core of a good theory, and indeed, without an explanation it can be 
argued that there is no theory (Sutton & Straw, 1995). For example, Sutton and Straw (1995, p.378) 
suggest that: 
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Theory is the answer to queries of why. Theory is about the connections among phenomena, a 
story about why acts, events, structure, and thoughts occur. Theory emphasizes the nature of 
causal relationships, identifying what comes first as well as the timing of such events. Strong 
theory…delves into the underlying processes so as to understand the systematic reasons for a 
particular occurrence or non-occurrence. 
That is, a “good theory provides a clear explanation of how and why specific relationships lead to 
specific events” (Nilsen, 2015, p.2). Given that flow remains a rare, elusive phenomenon (e.g., 
Aherne et al., 2011; Csikszentmihalyi et al., 2017), and the sufficient conditions for its occurrence are 
presently unknown, it could be argued that the common nine-dimensions conceptualization of flow is 
not an explanatory theory. Instead, it may be considered a framework, which describes a phenomenon 
in terms of its constructs or variables but does not provide an explanation (Nilsen, 2015).  
 Proximal vs. distal theories. In terms of moving forward in this field, the distinction 
between proximal and distal theories is also important to consider (see Kanfer, 1990 for a discussion 
in relation to motivation theory). For example, proximal explanation of a death may be lack of oxygen 
in the brain; a distal explanation may address the person‟s involvement in a car crash. Researchers 
have forwarded neuroscientific explanations of flow based on proximal causes (e.g., transient 
hypofrontatliy; Dietrich, 2004). Such theories of proximal causation may offer insight beyond that of 
Csikszentmihalyi‟s framework, and may be able to explain aspects of what happens in the brain or 
body as flow occurs; however, these proximal theories do not inform coaches/practitioners how to 
reliably induce flow among athletes and exercisers.  
Initially at least, the most useful explanation of flow would arguably be distal. To explain 
flow occurrence, this type of explanation would account for: (a) the necessary and sufficient 
conditions involved; (b) how these conditions interact with each other; and (c) how they interact with, 
or subsequently produce, the characteristics experienced during flow. With such knowledge, 
researchers could then more easily, and more robustly, develop proximal explanations of flow (e.g., 
through more reliable strategies for inducing flow experimentally). Inherently this approach assumes 
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a realist philosophy (e.g., Sayer, 2010), similar to Kimiecik and Stein (1992), in assuming that flow 
has causal mechanisms and can be causally explained through the identification of such mechanisms. 
Realist philosophy differs from the phenomenological approach Csikszentmihlayi appeared to take in 
his initial (1975) work and remains aligned with in his later work (see Csikszentmihalyi, 1992). We 
argue that to make scientific progress (discussed further below) in flow research in sport and exercise, 
a realist philosophy, with an active interest in causality, is required. In turn, a shift in methodology 
may also be required, for example, towards prospective, longitudinal, and/or „event-focused‟ designs 
(see Methodological Issues: Career-Based vs Event-Focused Perspectives).  
Issues in Applying Flow 
Without a strong explanatory theory, there is little causal evidence for coaches or practitioners 
to reliably draw upon in attempting to use Csikszentmihalyi‟s (1975, 2002) conceptualization to 
induce flow. For example, in health and medical settings, such an evidence base would need to 
include efficacy, replicability, effectiveness and scalability studies, and draw upon fully powered 
randomized controlled trials before translating into practice (e.g., Sallis, Owen & Fotheringham, 
2000). It is presently difficult to conduct experimental work on flow due to vague conceptualization 
of the flow experience/dimensions, issues in measurement, and limited understanding of causal 
mechanisms, or necessary and sufficient conditions. As Moller, Meier and Wall (2010 note:   
It is infeasible, at the moment, to attach a high-resolution brain scanner…to an athlete‟s or 
artist‟s head and have him or her wander around until an episode of flow sets in… Trying to 
induce flow in the lab is a bit like trying to make someone relax in a dentist‟s chair…While it is 
certainly possible, the task is far from easy, as the cold laboratory context often seems less than 
conducive, and the flow experience can be elusive, even under seemingly optimal conditions 
(p.192-193). 
As a result, much of the research on flow in sport and exercise, and flow research generally, has 
used interviews and correlational designs (Engeser & Schiepe-Tiska, 2012), with comparatively little 
experimental research on flow in this domain (Swann et al., 2012). In experimental studies to date, 
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flow has typically been measured as a secondary outcome (e.g., of various characteristics of music; 
Karageorghis et al., 2008), with fewer studies that explicitly aimed to induce flow as the dependent 
variable. Recent exceptions include Harris, Vine and Wilson (2017) who set incrementally more 
difficult specific goals to induce flow through challenge-skill balance; however similar work 
(Schweickle et al., 2017) found contradictory evidence that incrementally more difficult specific goals 
are detrimental to flow, and induce a more effortful state instead. Regardless, there is generally  
little research in sport and exercise that focuses specifically on experimentally inducing flow.  
In turn, it could be argued that intervention studies on flow in sport and exercise are 
premature. Such intervention studies have typically focused on skills and strategies that are not 
strongly linked to the occurrence of flow (e.g., hypnosis – Lindsay et al., 2005; mindfulness – Aherne 
et al., 2011). Intervention research designs have been small, and the resulting evidence has been 
largely inconclusive (Swann et al., 2012) in comparison to well-established, robust theories in 
psychology such as self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Fundamentally, there is weak 
knowledge of the conceptualization and operationalization of flow, which has subsequent effects in 
terms of inability to conduct stronger (e.g., experimental) research designs, and means that 
intervention studies are weak or inconclusive. As a result, there is an extremely limited evidence base 
for coaches and practitioners to confidently apply principles based on flow in applied settings. This 
issue is perhaps illustrated by the absence of empirical research on flow in sport coaching.  
A ‘Crisis Point’ in Flow Research in Sport and Exercise? 
In addition to the above criticisms and „anomalies‟, a number of insights have emerged 
recently which, taken together, suggest that flow research in sport and exercise could be reaching a 
„crisis point‟ (Kuhn, 1996). Emerging evidence and critical questions/problems highlight issues in 
fundamental assumptions about how to conceptualize and measure flow in this domain. Given these 
problems, it is difficult to confidently proceed with the traditional paradigm centered on 
Csikszentmihalyi‟s conceptualization of flow as nine dimensions. Thus, we suggest that research in 
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this field may be moving towards a paradigm shift and a period of „scientific revolution‟ or 
„extraordinary science‟ to address the issues.  
Does the Flow Conceptualization Conflate Two Distinct Psychological States? 
There is emerging evidence that the nine-dimensions conceptualization, as currently  
described, conflates (at least
3
) two distinct psychological states. This evidence stems from activities 
including sport (Swann, Crust & Vella, 2017), leisure (Houge Mackenzie et al., 2011, 2013), and 
occupational therapy (Wright, Wright, Sadlo & Stew, 2014). For example, it has been suggested that 
there are „different types of flow‟, by drawing upon Reversal Theory to propose „telic flow‟ and 
„paratelic flow‟ (Houge Mackenzie et al., 2011, 2013; Wright et al., 2014). Alternatively, Swann and 
colleagues (2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c) have reported a second „clutch‟ state, which shares 
overlapping characteristics with flow, but is distinct (i.e., different to flow, and both cannot be 
experienced at the same time). Together, this work suggests that Csikszentmihalyi‟s nine-dimensions 
conceptualization may conflate two distinct states.  
Telic and paratelic flow. In adventure activities, Houge Mackenzie et al (2013, p.218) 
reported: “a range of flow states that appeared to be related to different metamotivational state 
phases…[and flow] appeared to have different manifestations (e.g., telic flow and paratelic flow) 
depending on the phase and context in which it occurred” (p.227). Similar findings have been 
reported by Wright et al. in occupational science where: 
there might be various psychological states in which a person may be absorbed in an 
enjoyable occupation to the extent that they lose track of time and forget everything else apart 
from what they are focusing on at that particular moment (2014, p.183).  
                                                          
3
 The evidence presented here suggests that two distinct states are conflated within the nine-dimensions 
framework. It may be the case that other states, such as psychological momentum, are similarly conflated but 
without such evidence as yet we refer to two states specifically. 
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Telic flow (Houge Mackenzie et al., 2011) is proposed to occur in a challenging activity with 
clear/distinct outcome goals, and is characterized by: an achievement focus; intensity; immersion in 
the task; seriousness; trying to do what was planned; and having higher performance expectations. In 
addition, enjoyment is generally reported afterwards rather than during the activity, as a result of 
successfully completing the task (Houge Mackenzie et al., 2011). Further, attentional narrowing is 
required to complete the challenging task. Conversely, paratelic flow (Houge Mackenzie et al., 2011) 
is proposed to be undertaken without a clear outcome goal, and a lack of importance attributed to 
performance outcomes and future concerns. It is sensation oriented, exciting, and/or playful; with a 
heightened sense of immersion; less intense than telic flow; employs a wider attentional field; and 
depends less on successful completion of clear tasks, and more on participation in an engaging 
activity.  
Under scrutiny, however, this interpretation of flow using reversal theory could be considered 
problematic. Flow describes one form of subjective experience – a distinct psychological state – 
which means that the suggestion of two different types of one flow state is not consistent with its 
definition or conceptual basis. Furthermore, the conceptualization of flow should ideally be 
parsimonious; that is, one concept should not require explanation by another (e.g., Baker, 2016), as is 
the case by interpreting flow using reversal theory. Indeed, this process is likely to lead to further 
definitional and conceptual overlaps rather than scientific progress. Thus, if there is evidence for a 
similar psychological state to flow, then it would arguably be more constructive to define and 
delineate exactly what flow is, and conceptualize separately what the other state is.   
 Flow and clutch states. Recently, a refined and expanded perspective has emerged that 
includes a second distinct, yet overlapping, “clutch” state which also underlies excellent performance 
in sport (Swann et al., 2016, 2017b; see Figure 1). This evidence suggests that Csikszentmihalyi‟s 
nine dimensions – and measures based on those dimensions (discussed below) – capture both of these 
states; that is, the existing conceptualization of flow conflates both flow and clutch states as one 
(Jackman, Crust & Swann, 2017).   
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 Clutch performance has been defined previously as “any performance increment or superior 
performance that occurs under pressure situations” (Otten, 2009 p. 584). Clutch states differ from 
flow in a number of ways, whilst also sharing a range of overlapping characteristics. Specifically, 
clutch states are characterized by complete and deliberate focus on the task, whereas flow is 
characterized by effortless attention; clutch states involve heightened awareness of the situation and 
its demands, whereas flow involves positive feedback and feelings that „everything is going to plan‟; 
and clutch states involve intense effort, in contrast to flow which is characterized by an effortless, 
automatic experience. Common to both states, however, are the experiences of enjoyment, enhanced 
motivation, perceived control, altered perceptions of time and the environment, absorption, and 
confidence (Swann et al., 2017a). These findings have been summarized as a „tentative solution‟ (i.e., 
a starting point for further testing and refinement; Popper, 1959) in an Integrated Model of Flow and 
Clutch States (Swann et al., 2017a), which also described the contexts, processes of occurrence, and 
outcomes of each state (see Figure 1). To date this work has been primarily qualitative, and – similar 
to Csikszentmihalyi‟s (1975) initial work – emerged through inductive analyses.  
 Summary. There are similarities in the descriptions of „telic flow‟ (Houge Mackenzie et al., 
2011) and „clutch‟ states (Swann et al., 2017b). Specifically, both states have been described as more 
intense than typical descriptions of flow; and occur in situations involving a clear outcome goal in a 
challenging task whereby enjoyment is primarily gained afterwards upon reflection on the 
accomplishment. Together, these overlaps suggest that a second psychological state is encompassed 
or conflated within the original description of flow as nine dimensions (see Table 1).  
Methodological Issues in Flow Research in Sport and Exercise  
Career-based vs. event-focused perspectives. Flow has been conceptualized using „career-
based‟ interviews that are not specific to certain events, and instead seek athletes‟ general reflections 
of flow more broadly throughout their career (see Swann, Keegan, Crust, & Piggott, 2016). This 
approach was used in Csikszentmihalyi‟s (1975) initial interviews on flow, and in Jackson‟s (1995, 
1996) influential studies on flow in sport, which later informed development of the Flow Scales (e.g., 
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FSS-2; see following section). As such, flow has been conceptualized from a „career-based‟ 
perspective. Problematically, these interviews are limited by the risk of athletes forgetting details 
(Yarrow, Campbell, & Burton, 1970) or presenting a biased recall (Brewer, Van Raalte, Linder, & 
Van Raalte, 1991), as they rely on memory of an event that may have occurred months or years in the 
past. Furthermore, this method‟s reliance on memory of past experiences alludes to issues of what 
Neisser (1981) termed episodic versus repisodic memory. Episodic recall “involves the retrieval of 
particular autobiographical moments, individual episodes of one‟s life” (p.114). Repisodic memory 
involves:   
a set of repeated experiences, a sequence of related events that the single recollection merely 
typifies or represents… (One) is not remembering the “gist” of a single episode by itself, but 
the common characteristics of a whole series of events…extract (ing) the common themes 
that remained invariant across…many experiences (p.114).  
When stronger methodologies, which capture more recent data about specific flow states, are 
employed a different picture emerges. Swann et al. (2016, 2017a) and Jackman et al. (2017) have 
conducted „event-focused‟ interviews as soon as possible after a specific performance (on average 
four days later in these studies), through which the perspective of flow and clutch states emerged. 
Similarly, Houge Mackenzie et al. (2011) employed head mounted cameras followed by same-day 
interviews, and reported the telic and paratelic flow states described above. „Event-focused‟ 
approaches enable more recent, chronological, and detailed recall of the experiences and processes 
underlying these states (Reis & Gable, 2000). In turn, this approach suggests that two distinct 
psychological states are conflated within the common conceptualization of flow. Arguably, the 
development of better theory – i.e., theory that dares to specify causal conditions and sequences 
(Lakatos, 1970; Hassmén et al., 2016) – cannot be developed with career-based interviews as the 
accounts are not detailed or accurate enough to track the sequence of events and responses leading to 
flow. Indeed, it may be the case that use of career-based interviews in early work on flow has led to 
some of the issues that have been evident in this field as described above (e.g., vague definition of 
dimensions, apparent aggregation of multiple states into the common conceptualization).   
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Issues in the Flow State Scale-2. Further to the issues in conceptualization and measurement 
of flow discussed above, a number of problems are apparent in arguably the primary measure of flow 
used in sport and exercise - the Flow State Scale-2 (Jackson & Eklund, 2004). For example, “research 
has not rigorously examined how one can interpret the scores from the flow scales to know whether 
the respondents were in the state of flow” (Kawabata & Evans, 2016, p.268). Specifically, uncertainty 
over which dimensions are necessary to constitute a flow state (discussed above) creates problems for 
researchers interpreting data from the FSS-2. To illustrate, a person who had lower scores across all 
nine dimensions could have the same FSS-2 score as a person who was high on only a few 
dimensions. Quantitatively, these experiences would be similar, yet they could arguably be very 
different experiences from a qualitative perspective.  
There is also little guidance for deciding what score on specific dimensions constitutes flow. 
Researchers have attempted to identify cut-off values for specific dimensions, but these have been 
problematic. For example, Kawabata and Evans (2016) proposed item-average scores of challenge-
skills balance, clear goals, and unambiguous feedback above 3.4 and below 3.3 as criteria to identify 
individuals experiencing flow and non-flow, respectively. Jackman et al. (2017), however, reported 
that of 46 performances meeting Kawabata and Evans‟ (2016) criteria, only 21 were described as flow 
during subsequent interviews; while Kawabata and Evans‟ (2016) criteria were met in 84% of 
performances in which athletes did not report flow. Thus, it remains unclear as to whether the primary 
measure of flow can identify participants who experience it, which is a concern given that much of the 
research in this field is based on the FSS-2. 
Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that the FSS-2 does not discriminate between flow and 
clutch states. With 10 athletes, across 22 performances, Jackman et al. (2017) compared FSS-2 data 
against interviews about the same experiences, and found that the FSS-2 captured clutch states as well 
as flow. Indeed, Jackman et al. (2017) outlined validity concerns relating to each of the nine subscales 
representing Csikszentmihalyi‟s dimensions, and concluded that “the majority of FSS-2 items could 
represent the experience reported during clutch states” (p.119). These findings are perhaps 
unsurprising given that clutch states have only emerged recently, through interview approaches which 
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had not yet been used at the time that the FSS-2 was developed. Regardless, this initial evidence (if 
supported elsewhere) raises questions over the validity of the FSS-2, and potentially knowledge of 
flow based on the FSS-2 to date (e.g., whether the data are specific to flow, clutch, or some 
combination of both states).  
Summary. To summarize, the common conceptualization of flow, the primary measure 
available (FSS-2), and much of the research on flow in sport and exercise to date stems from a 
„career-based‟ perspective. „Event-focused‟ studies yield a different picture and raise questions over 
fundamental assumptions about flow to date. Specifically, recent evidence suggests that 
Csikszentmihalyi‟s conceptualization of flow conflates two states into one, and that the primary 
measure of flow in sport and exercise (FSS-2) may demonstrate low discriminant validity. This 
emerging evidence raises questions and doubt over fundamental assumptions in the conceptualization 
and measurement of flow in sport and exercise, which stems from initial career-based interviews. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the field is approaching a crisis point, whereby it is difficult to 
confidently proceed with the traditional nine-dimensions paradigm.  
Moving Forward: Ways of Making Scientific Progress 
As explained earlier in this paper, the Kuhnian and Popperian views of science come with 
very different definitions of progress. Where Kuhn associated progress with the extension of the 
paradigm and increased rate of puzzle-solving, Popper argued for a realist view where theories 
become increasingly truth-like through the making of bold predictions and submission to increasingly 
severe criticism. Put another way, for Kuhn progress depends on agreement between members of a 
paradigm, whereas for Popper progress depends on disagreement and criticism (Popper, 1994). There 
exists, however, a third view that tries to reconcile these polar positions: that of Popper‟s student and 
successor, Imre Lakatos. 
Like Popper, Lakatos (1970) offered normative ideas for evaluating the state of what he 
called „research programs‟, or a series of theories (akin to a paradigm). Rather than distinguishing 
rules of demarcation between science and pseudoscience, Lakatos tried to distinguish good science 
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from bad (Motterlini, 1999). Siding with Kuhn, Lakatos believed that it was necessary for scientists to 
defend their research programs with some tenacity, especially in the early stages of development. In 
line with Popper, however, he also argued that they should not attempt to save research programs 
from criticism by creating ad-hoc hypotheses (i.e., „patching up procedures‟), as anomalies emerge. 
Good scientific theories should be made to “stick their necks out” (Lakatos, 1970, p.111) by making 
bold predictions – ruling out specific states of affairs – and specifying „rejection rules‟, or conditions 
under which criticism of a theory would be accepted. The continuous defense and attack of research 
programs, Lakatos imagined, would be a “long and often frustrating process”  (1970, p. 179) but one 
that ought to be evaluated against two clear ideal types he called progressive (move towards) and 
degenerating (move away from). 
Degenerating research programs are those where theories do not predict novel facts and 
where scientists consistently „save‟ theories from criticism with the invention of new ad-hoc 
hypotheses. Progressive research programs, on the other hand, contain theories that make bold 
predictions and, as a consequence, are likely to have undergone and survived harsher criticism than 
rival theories (Motterlini, 1999). Scientists should therefore prefer to work on, and invest resources in, 
progressive programs. In cases where no real choice of research program exists (arguably in the case 
of flow), Lakatos (1970) proposed that scientists initiate „progressive shifts‟ by following 
„sophisticated‟ Popperian principles: (i) developing theories that are more testable, and (ii) submitting 
them to harsher tests, thus increasing their degree of corroboration, or modifying them through „error 
elimination‟. 
So far we have argued that the flow paradigm is approaching a moment of „crisis‟ (cf. Kuhn, 
1996), given the volume of unanswered criticism and „anomalies‟ that have emerged. Another, 
perhaps more constructive, way of putting this is to suggest that flow research is degenerating (e.g., 
the failure to predict flow; a priori coding of data into existing dimensions; soft correlation-based 
tests etc.) and is therefore awaiting a progressive shift. Table 2 highlights examples that may 
characterize progressive and degenerative research at this point. Such a shift would be characterized 
by the development of theory that attempts to define the necessary and sufficient conditions that cause 
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flow to occur (as described above). Such theory would make clear predictions and thus be more 
amenable to „testing‟ and likely increase in corroboration – as is the case with the preliminary 
Integrated Model of Flow and Clutch States (Swann et al., 2017a). With more testable theory comes 
harsher tests (e.g., event-focused, stimulated recall interviews and direct observation; experiments; 
randomized controlled trials; more accurate psychometric instruments) and also more practical 
applications.  
Possibilities for a Practically Useful Theory in Sport and Exercise 
A progressive shift of the sort mentioned above – with the development of a distal causal 
explanation outlining necessary and sufficient conditions – should also be practically useful. 
Currently it is difficult, if not impossible, for coaches and athletes to reliably induce flow based on 
Csikszentmihlayi‟s conceptualization. With the explanation of mechanisms underlying the occurrence 
of flow (and overlapping states, like clutch), athletes, coaches, and sport science practitioners may be 
better able to create interventions and practices to induce and manage (e.g., prolong) them. 
Furthermore, reliable manipulation of flow experiences would enable stronger research designs that 
can provide more robust evidence on the causal relationships between flow and outcomes such as 
performance, wellbeing, and motivation. It would also enable the systematic investigation of 
psychological and behavioral strategies that can be used to induce and/or maintain the flow state. For 
example, a practically useful theory should inform athletes and exercisers of strategies for inducing 
and maintaining such states, and how/when to use them. Another primary consideration for coaches, 
practitioners and athletes/exercisers is understanding “when is the right time to be in flow?” For 
example, clutch states appear to be more constructive during pressure phases when an outcome is on 
the line; whereas flow states appear to be useful in contexts of exploration, discovery, and 
experimentation (Swann et al., 2017a). Therefore, a practically useful theory should include 
knowledge of the type of context necessary to experience flow (e.g., across stages of a season; within 
phases of a specific performance). By informing coaches and practitioners of the right time or context 
to experience flow, and how to get there, a practically useful theory could assist in decision-making 
regarding when (e.g., half time; calling time outs), and how to communicate with athletes 
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experiencing flow. A strong, practically useful theory could therefore be relevant from grassroots to 
elite sport, and from beginners to experienced exercisers. 
Conclusion 
Csikszentmihalyi‟s concept of flow has generated extensive interest in sport and exercise. 
Important work has been done to conceptualize flow experiences (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; 
Jackson, 1996), and lay a foundation for research in this domain. We argue that a period of „normal 
science‟ (Kuhn, 1996) has ensued, and that a series of criticisms or „anomalies‟ have gradually 
accumulated in this field, which have been accelerated by recent insights stemming from an „event-
focused‟ perspective (e.g., Swann et al., 2016). In turn, we argue that the field is reaching a „crisis 
point‟ in terms of apparent flaws in the existing conceptualization and common measures of flow 
(e.g., the FSS-2), which seem to conflate multiple psychological states as one. If this argument is 
accepted, questions could be raised over much of the knowledge of flow generated to date (e.g., 
regarding the experience, occurrence, and factors associated with the nine-dimensions 
conceptualization). We argue that these problems and questions can be addressed with the adoption of 
„progressive‟ (i.e. Popperian or Lakatosian) attitudes and methods that aim to criticize existing 
knowledge of flow and foster more testable theories concerning flow occurrence. The development of 
a more progressive research program will also likely lead to more useful theories that will better 
inform coaches, practitioners, athletes, and exercisers seeking flow states.  
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn imagined that periods of normal science and 
revolutionary science occurred in a strict sequence and could not overlap. Kuhn‟s critics, however 
(notably Lakatos and Feyerabend – see Motterlini, 1999), argued that communities of researchers may 
contain two kinds of scientist – „defenders‟ and „attackers‟ of the paradigm, who exist and interact 
simultaneously. Indeed, a critical interaction between these two is arguably necessary for scientific 
progress to occur (Lakatos, 1970). Thus, we seek to stimulate critical discussion around the state of 
flow research in sport and exercise, with the ultimate aim of making scientific progress through 
improved understanding and application of this highly desirable phenomenon. 
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Table 1 Qualitative evidence meeting definitions for Csikszentmihalyi’s nine dimensions from both 
flow and clutch states 
Dimension Flow Clutch 
Challenge-skill 
balance 
I really wanted to try and ... test yourself 
[sic] in a way, you know, challenge 
yourself to do it in the most pressure-
packed situation (1) 
I only had three holes left of the tournament to 
play ... the three [most] important holes ... This 
was it, this was my time now. This is where I 
can win (1) 
Clear goals 
I'm at the top [of the leader board]; all I'm 
thinking about is ... trying to go forward, 
trying to get further in front ... It's the kind 
of one-sighted vision that I had to go 
further ahead (1) 
There's only two shots between me and the next 
guy, so now there's a goal there, to finish with 
two pars ... There was like a target at the end 
that you had to produce (1) 
Unambiguous 
feedback 
“nothing can go wrong ... you feel things 
going your way” (1); “everything seems to 
fall into place” (1) 
I was getting into position and getting on 
possessions, reading the play well (4) 
Concentration 
on the task at 
hand 
I think it's just something that happens 
naturally ... I'm concentrating…that's for 
sure…but it's just something that seems to 
happen (1) 
I made myself focus even more on that last hole 
... I was trying a little bit harder to be intense 
(1) 
Action-
awareness 
merging 
[I] was just trying to take one shot at a 
time ... the same routine for every single 
shot…I've come off the 18th, looked at my 
caddy and said “what score have I shot?” 
Because I didn't know (1) 
It just feels like I'm so focused and nothing else 
is around me ... it's just me and the ball ... that's 
it, I don't think about anything else ... nothing 
else was happening as far as I was concerned 
(1) 
Sense of 
control 
It was just controlled all the way 
through…I‟ve never experienced that 
before… everything was really controlled.  
And people said that…I looked quite in 
control (2) 
when you're fully ... aware of what the situation 
was... [and being in] control of the situation (1); 
I just felt in control of everything ... it felt like I 
had complete control of myself and my 
emotions (1) 
Loss of self-
consciousness 
I didn't have any negative thoughts - 
everything I saw was positive 1; I didn‟t 
care about anything other than making the 
right decision (4) 
[In] the World Cup Final…with one minute to 
go, and everything riding on it…24 years of 
history...There‟s a fair bit of pressure on this...I 
wasn‟t thinking about that.  I knew the job I had 
to do; I wasn‟t thinking about 24 years or what 
the crowd thought…I was in a zone.  I was 
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getting the job done that I‟ve always done and it 
didn‟t matter that it was the World Cup final (3) 
Transformation 
of time 
Time went by quickly (1); I was totally 
engaged in the run. It was very rare that I 
would have looked at my watch (4) 
Looking back on it yeah it did go pretty quick 
(1);  I‟m not thinking of my time. I‟m thinking, 
“hit that end line: (4) 
Autotelic 
experience 
I don‟t know if I‟d have thought at the time 
“oh this is really fun”.  I was just thinking 
“this is good”.  But that‟s an enjoyable 
experience knowing that you‟re doing well 
and thinking that this is going well, so yes, 
it was definitely an enjoyable experience 
(2) 
It‟s funny because you do enjoy it and you 
don‟t enjoy it.  Obviously you want to win, so 
with the fact you might lose, you‟re not 
enjoying it in that sense.  But you‟re enjoying 
the fact that it‟s becoming close and, if you end 
up winning the set, then the emotion that you‟ll 
feel will be awesome (3) 
Note: 1 = Swann et al. (2016); 2 = Swann et al. (2017a); 3 = Swann et al (2017b); 4 = Jackman et al. 
(2017) 
 
Table 2 Examples of progressive and degenerative research in current state of flow in sport and 
exercise 
Classification Research examples Explanation of classification 
Degenerative 
research 
Career-based interview studies 
seeking to understand 
experience and/or occurrence 
of flow 
Relies on recall of events up to months or years in 
the past, resulting in broad/imprecise description of 
experiences (e.g., through repisodic memory) which 
appear to conflate flow and clutch states, and 
identify associations rather than causal mechanisms 
Uncritical adoption of 
Csikszentmihalyi‟s nine 
dimensions (e.g., coding 
qualitative data into 
dimensions a priori, or 
development of new measures 
based on nine dimensions) 
Evidence that nine dimensions conflates two 
distinct psychological states, stemming from career-
based foundations; broad and imprecise definition 
of nine dimensions, with overlapping 
conceptualisation of core aspects of the experience, 
and other prominent features of the flow experience 
unaccounted for 
Uncritical use of FSS-2 (e.g., 
to examine correlations with 
flow, or to assess flow as a 
primary or secondary outcome) 
Questions over validity of FSS-2 with potential that 
it captures both flow and clutch states; issues in 
interpreting FSS-2 data in terms of cut-offs and 
necessary/sufficient dimensions for flow, as well as 
low support for some dimensions 
Progressive 
research 
Event-focused interview 
studies exploring the 
experience and/or occurrence 
of flow, which minimise the 
delay between event and 
Enables more recent and detailed recall of specific 
experiences (e.g., through episodic memory) where 
participants can distinguish between flow other 
states (e.g., clutch); chronological recall enables 
exploration of chronological sequence of flow 
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interview (e.g., conducted 
within hours/days) 
occurrence and possible causal mechanisms  
Studies seeking to collect real-
time/in-the-moment data on 
flow during sport and exercise  
Allow examination of flow experience during 
activities rather than recall after completion of the 
event; compare in-the-moment data with recall 
(e.g., event-focused interviews) and potentially 
refine understanding and conceptualization of the 
flow experience 
Critically examining the 
validity of FSS-2 and other 
common measures (e.g., Flow 
Short Scale; Engeser & 
Rheinberg, 2008) 
Further test initial evidence that the 
conceptualization of flow, and the FSS-2, conflates 
flow and clutch states; better understand potential 
need to re-examine knowledge of flow stemming 
from these measures (e.g., correlates of flow 
identified in studies using FSS-2) 
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Figure 1: The integrated model of flow and clutch states  
Note: Figure as originally published in Swann, Crust, Jackman, Vella, Allen & Keegan (2017). 
Psychological states underlying excellent performance in sport: Towards an integrated model of flow 
and clutch states. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 29, 375-401.  
 
 
 
 
 
